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ABSTRACT
ICON-FORM: THE DIFFERENTIAL LOGIC OF ANICONISM IN
ISLAMIC TRADITION
Nuh Yılmaz
M.F.A. in Graphic Design
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman
August, 2001
This study aims to analyse the perception of the icons
and figural representation in the Islamic tradition in
the framework of fetishism. Following debates of
fetishism, a new concept, icon-form will be proposed in
order to understand the situation of icons in Islam.
After that this concept, icon-form will be tested in
the case of calligraphy. This may lead to a different
approach to the Islamic economy of vision.
Key Words: Icon-form, fetishism, calligraphy, icon,
figural representation, discourse, figure, and mimesis.
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ÖZET
İKON-BİÇİM: İSLAMİ GELENEKTE İKONSUZLUĞUN
FARKA DAYALI MANTIĞI
Nuh Yılmaz
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü
Yüksek Lisans
Tez Yöneticisi: Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman
August, 2001
Bu çalışma, İslam geleneği içinde ikonların ve figüre
dayalı temsil biçimlerinin algılanmasını fetişizm
çerçevesinde incelemeyi amaçlıyor. Fetişizm
tartışmaları takip edilerek, ikonların durumunu anlamak
üzere yeni bir kavram, ikon-biçim öneriliyor.
Sonrasında bu kavram hat sanatı örneğinde sınanıyor.
Böylelikle  İslami görüş ekonomisine farklı bir
yaklaşım deneniyor.
Anahtar Kelimeler: İkon-biçim, fetişizm, hat, ikon,
figüre dayalı temsil, söylem, figür ve öykünme.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study aims to analyse the perception of the
icons and figural representation in the Islamic
tradition, in doing so, it will show how the
conventional wisdom about figural representations or
icons is unable to explain the complicated structure of
icons. Hence, this thesis, particularly, maintains that
unless an alternative perspective is developed based on
an idea of icon-form, the major shortcomings in
delineating the issue is going to persist. This
analysis does not cover the historical development of
icons or figural representation, instead it endeavours
to locate these debates in a theoretical framework with
following some important figures such as Freud, Marx,
Žižek and Baudrillard. In the first chapter, I
initially will focus on the problem of fetishism and
the primacy of form in any systemic structure in order
to propose a new concept, icon-form.
Conceptualisation of fetishism helps us to
understand the break in people’s beliefs and practical
lives. The answer of the question why people does not
behave the way they believe could be best understood by
2the concept of fetishism. In fetishism the logic of ‘as
if’ determines the behaviour of people.
Having analysed fetishism, the distinction between
use value and exchange value will be analysed in the
light of form. In any structure, this distinction
collapses, instead, the value of object is determined
differentially. This differential determination of
value gives priority to the form not the content, like
commodity-form and sign-form.
Thus, in order to analyse the status of icons, by
criticising the two mainstream approaches, one is
defended by Grabar and Allen who argue that there is no
prohibition of icons or figural representation in
Islam, and the other that is defended by Islamic
Orthodoxy advocates that there is a strict prohibition
of icons or figural representations, I will propose the
concept of icon-form. These two different ideas are
both correct and incorrect because of the similarity of
their theoretical grounds. Both share the same
metaphysical background, privileging the meaning over
form in distinction between form and content. Hence,
form is taken as accidental and supplementary in both
approaches. Using the concept of icon-form, I firstly
3tried to reconcile the totally different arguments, and
then to display their blind spot that stems from their
negligence of the importance of form.
In the second chapter, I take the calligraphy as
an Islamic art form in which icon-form works well and
as an art that cannot be analysed by those two
approaches. The genesis of the calligraphy indicates
the avoidance from figural representation from one
perspective, which is at the same time nourished by
Islamic Orthodoxy. On the other hand, because of its
undecidable character, calligraphy can be seen as an
example of figural representation that supports the
other approaches outside Islamic Orthodoxy. However,
highlighting the ideas of Hamid Dabashi and Lyotard,
the relation between Islamic understanding of images
and Judaism is exhibited. Analysing the historical
construction of vision and visuality, this thesis will,
mainly, delineate the particularity of the Islamic
economy of vision. Nevertheless, these explications are
not enough to understand of the nature of calligraphy
from the angle of icon-form. Therefore, I have argued
the borders of figure and discourse in reference to
Lyotard. In the end, the concurrent ideas between
Lyotard and Ibn Arabi support this ambiguous relation
4between figure and discourse and the singular character
of writing. Lastly, the singularity of the Islamic
vision stems from its different construction of
representation, that could be defined as mimesis
according to Zeynep Sayın.
To sum up, calligraphy is the crux of the problem
of figural representation in Islam. As a non-signifying
signifier, calligraphy threads the problem of
representation. While it signifies itself, it attempts
to show the Absence of Face of the Unseen. Ultimately
it is an objet a, which cannot satisfy the will to see,
but it shows the eternal lack by showing itself. There
is a powerful regime of representation, which shows the
absence and the presence of the Face of the Unseen at
the same time that indicates both prohibition of the
figural representation and the legitimate status of
figural representation. These opposite poles can be
understood by the help of the concept of icon-form.
52. ICON-FORM: THE STATUS OF ICONS AND FIGURAL
REPRESENTATION IN ISLAM
2.1. FREUD’S CONCEPTUALISATION OF FETISH
Fetishism is one of the most crucial concepts, which is
used in modern philosophy, sociology and religion.
Although this term is used in a wide area, I
specifically will focus on Freud’s conception of
fetishism in its relation with the importance of form
and fetishism in relation to icons.
Freud considers the fetish as an abnormality, as a
penis-substitute but not as an illness (214).  This
substitution is closely related with childhood
experience. The boy child thinks that his mother has a
phallus, however he sees that his mother does not have
a phallus. In this process he knows that his mother has
not got a penis, but he can not accept this fact, he
disavows this reality.  Fetish functions as a
substitution of his mothers absent penis whose purpose
targets this loss, and tries to preserve it.
The best example of fetish is the mother’s
phallus. The boy once believed that his mother has
phallus, but now he sees that his mother has not got a
6phallus, but he denies its absence. This is the boy’s
denial of the fact that his mother has no penis. If
woman can be castrated, his organ is in danger also.
Freud firstly criticises the idea of
‘scotomization’, which is defended by Laforgue (215).
According to Freud this denial is not merely
scotomization, conversely “The perception has persisted
and that a very energetic action has been exerted to
keep up the denial of it.” (217). Thus he gives a
unique importance to fetish which has a twofold action.
On the one hand person retains that belief, on the
other hand he also gives it up. There is a very
energetic conflict between opposite beliefs in the
unconscious. This is a specific kind of repression for
which man expenses a lot of energy.
The consequence of this belief is that woman in
the physical reality has a penis. Nevertheless, this is
not the same with the penis as it once was.
Freud does not stop here: when fetish comes to
life some processes in the memory has been suddenly
interrupted. There is a traumatic experience for
fetishist; fetish occurred immediate before this
experience: ‘last impression received before the
7uncanny traumatic one is preserved as a fetish.’ (Freud
217). The consequence of this ‘traumatic amnesia’ has a
twofold outcome that creates the double character of
fetish. On the one side, man denies the fact of
castration, on the other side, he asseverates it.
Therefore, fetish conceived as tender and hostile which
were mixed in fetish in unequal degrees. Accordingly,
fetishist believes that his mother once has penis, but
the father castrated the woman.
2.2. MARX’ CONCEPTUALISATION OF COMMODITY FETISHISM
Marx socialises fetishism in the case of capitalism.
For him capitalism presents itself as “an immense
accumulation of commodities” (Marx 43). Marx defines
firstly commodity as ‘an object outside of us’ which
satisfies human needs. In the second step, he separates
the value about commodity in two ways: one is use value
that is related with the objects of utility, which is
limited by physical properties and the other is
exchange value that is a ‘quantitative relation’ which
is changed according to time and place, a ‘proportion’
which is relative and accidental (Marx 44).
Exchange value has two consequences, firstly, it
assumes an equality between different commodities,
secondly, it is only the ‘mode of expression’,
8‘phenomenal form’. There must be a third thing for
equality between two things that is neither the one nor
the other. Two things must be reducible to this third
thing. Thus, total abstraction from the use-value is
the condition of possibility of the exchange value.
When you make an abstraction from use-value you can not
talk about the object itself, but there is only the
form. In the exchange value, there is nothing left to
the object; everything reduced to the one and the same
sort of labour. However, when we change the
commodities, exchange value perceived as if it is
totally independent from its use-value and human
labour. This operation also equalises the human labour
that are also different in all commodities but we see
only use value and exchange value which are hidden in
the human labour (Marx 48).
Every commodity, in its use value has also labour.
Nonetheless, commodities does not confront each other
as use values, therefore we can not see different
labours. There is only an abstract human labour in each
value commodity which is presented as if they are equal
(Marx 51). This identical and abstract human labour
“creates and forms the value of commodities”(Marx 53).
Thus, Marx thinks that commodities have two forms one
9is “physical/natural form” and the other is “value-
from”. Then he concludes that value of commodity is
“purely a social reality”. Because that value can be
seen only in “the social relation of commodity to
commodity” (Marx 54). Due to this value-form we can
exchange the commodities and take them as if they are
equal. For Marx this value-form, this logic of equation
is the “whole mystery” of the capitalist system. When
we equate the objects, we also equate the human labour
embodied in them and we exchange the different human
labours without noticing them. Therefore, in each
commodity we speak about the commodity-form, value-
form.
This value-form is not a single, specific thing
for Marx, but it has “general form of value”. Every
commodity expresses their value in two ways: first, “in
an elementary form, because in a single commodity;
second, with unity because in one and the same
commodity.” (Marx 70). This general form of value
abstracts all objects to an equal value; it isolates
objects, determines its abstract value and expands this
value to all objects, so this operation covers all the
objects. Nothing can escape this process. The general
value-form is the reduction of all kinds of actual
10
labours to the abstract human labour. This general
value-form is the solidification of all
undifferentiated human labour and the “social resumé of
the world of commodities” that creates the social
character of commodities. Nonetheless, there are always
some problems from commodity A, to commodity B or to
commodity C. Hence, the system needs a universal
equivalent form which equates everything to the
everything. This simple commodity-form for Marx is the
“money-form”(75).
Marx in his book talks about the exchange value as
a social relation. The mystical character of the
commodities does not stem from their use values, but it
comes from their systemic character. In such a context
human labour is represented as if it is objective
quality of the object “fetishism attaches itself to the
products of labour” (Marx 77). It conceals its social
relation in whom we can not speak about the relation
between the men and thing, however we perceive that
relation as if it is between the things. Actually,
there is “a material relation between persons and
social relation between things” (Marx 78). The most
different kinds of human labours are reduced to an
abstract human labour and functions as an equal value.
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Human labour turns out to be a common denominator. The
magnitude of value is measured by its labour time in
the market, although its value is determined under the
conditions of relative values of commodities. The very
crucial problem is that “we are not aware of this,
nevertheless we do it” (Marx 79). According to Marx,
value “converts every product into a social
hieroglyphic”, therefore object of utility is a ”social
product as language”(79).
Finally, the exchange value of a product is
decided according to the relative value of commodities
though it is perceived as if it is determined according
to the labour-time. This is the secret of commodities.
Exchange value is exactly determined as a social
relation. Its value does not come from its material,
objective qualities, but stems from the network of
commodities. Thus, exchange value is an attribute of
commodities. Marx gives the example of chemist and
argues that no chemist can discover the exchange value
in a diamond or pearl, it can be found only in the
complex relations of social processes.  Two crucial
outcomes could be derived from Marx’s argumentation;
firstly, we are not aware the fetishistic processes but
12
we do it, secondly, exchange value is related with the
form not the content.
2.3. REEVALUATING MARX AND FREUD: ŽIŽEK
Žižek finds a “fundamental homology” between Marx and
Freud in the case of interpretation of commodities and
dreams that is their avoidance from the fetishistic
fascination of the content hidden behind the form(Žižek
11). Both think that the ‘secret’ is not the commodity
or dream, but “the secret of this form itself”. Žižek
thinks that  classical political economy focussed on
the secret behind the commodity-form, but Marx
concentrates on “the secret of this form itself” (15).
It is the same process in Freud, he also focuses on the
dream-form not the latent meaning or content in the
dream-work.
Žižek goes on his argument with differentiation of
the two kind of fetishism: one is in pre-capitalist
societies, and the other is in the capitalist
societies. In the case of pre-capitalist society
commodity fetishism is not yet developed, the goal of
the production is not for the market. Fetishism occurs
in the relation between people in which this relation
is mediated through a network of ideological beliefs.
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Nevertheless, in the capitalist societies in which
commodity fetishism reigns, “relations between men are
totally de-fetishized” in contrast to relation between
things (Žižek 25). They behave as free men and there is
a social relation between the things.
 Then Žižek criticises the idea of any kind of
false consciousness in Marx by arguing that Marx
accepts that ‘they do not know but they do it’;
nevertheless this argument also assumes a reality and
also the notion of illusion. Žižek discusses that
reality is ‘a claim of truth’. The misrecognition is
not about the reality, but about the illusion which
structures their reality: “They know very well how
things really are, but still they are doing it as if
they did not know” (Žižek 32). There is a double
illusion. There is an ideological fantasy which is not
attached to the knowledge, but is about the “fantasy
structuring our social reality itself” (Žižek 33). It
can be concluded that ‘they know what they are doing,
and they are doing it’.1
                                                
1 Žižek gives an example of freedom in this
argument. He argues that they know the idea of freedom
masks the exploitation, but they also defend it.
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2.4. THE IMPORTANCE OF SIGN-FORM: BAUDRILLARD
Baudrillard thinks that for Marx, commodity fetishism
is the lived ideology of capitalism by which man
internalises the generalised system of exchange value.
Commodity fetishism is not the false consciousness,
devoted to the worship of the exchange value. He takes
fetishism as fetishization of the conscious subject or
a kind of  “rationalist metaphysics” on which the
general occidental Christian values are constructed
(Baudrillard, Fetishism 89). Therefore, fetishism
brings Marxism into Western superstructure, but it
fails to analyse the actual process of ideological
labour. Thus, Western thought keeps the division
between infrastructure and superstructure that must be
exploded.
For him, only psychoanalysis is free from this
vicious circle of fetishism “by returning fetishism to
its context within a perverse structure that perhaps
underlies all desire” by which it becomes an analytic
concept for a theory of perversion that is a structural
definition (Baudrillard 90). He offers to abandon any
kind of alienation, value or substance, instead there
must be a “passion for code”, and a fascination of the
15
object itself. Fetishism is not the fetishism of
signified or even fetishism of the signifier but it “is
the fascination for a form (logic of system of exchange
value), a state of absorption, for better or for worse,
in the restrictive logic of a system of abstraction.”
(Baudrillard, Fetishism 92).  Hence, fetishism is not
the process sanctification of a certain object, but the
sanctification of the system as such and the commodity
as system and abstraction of a mark, ie, generalisation
of exchange values.
In the process of fetishism, there is another type
of labour that is not a concrete labour, “a labour of
signification, that is coded abstraction (the
production of differences and of sign values)”
(Baudrillard, Fetishism 93). There is an unbounded free
desire which produces the system, (code) which is
separated out from the process of real labour, denies
the process of real labour.  Therefore, fetishism is
related with a sign-object that is “eviscerated from
its substance and history, reduced to the state of
marking a difference, epitomising a whole system of
differences.” Fetish object is a sign-object that is
free from the substance. For instance in Jewish
mythology “golden calf” is not the fetishized object,
16
but the total abstraction, “closed perfection of
system”, its systematic nature is fetishized
(Baudrillard, Fetishism 93). In this system use-value
is not an apparent, clear, intelligible original value
whereas it is the obscure, unintelligible value that is
“a function derived from exchange value” (Baudrillard,
Fetishism fn.4 93).
After that, he gives some specific examples like
beauty, in that case the mark in beauty fascinates the
body and transforms it into a perfect object. It is
closely related with the differential system of
signification. Fetish substitutes the formal divisions
between signs and irreducible ambivalence. What
fascinates us always “excludes us in the name of its
internal logic or perfection” (Baudrillard, Fetishism
96). In this case, ideology is constituted in this
semiological reduction of symbolic. In the ideological
process fetish-object loses its ambivalence and
signifies purely good or purely bad attributes. This is
the semiological reduction by which everything reduced
in a binary opposition and ignores the differential
system. Consequently, marking by signs is always
accompanied by a totalisation via signs and a formal
autonomy of sign systems at the end, this total
17
abstraction and generalisation allows sign to function
ideologically.
Thus, critique of political economy of sign
enables us to analyse sign form (Baudrillard, Towards
143). Sign is composed of two parts as signifier and
signified, therefore sign form has to be analysed in
both ways.  Baudrillard takes signifier as exchange
value, and signified as use value in this taxonomy in
which the problem is not the production of sign or
materiality of it, but its very form (144). Ideology in
this case closely related with its form not with
content. Hence, Baudrillard consider that ideology is
the “process of reducing and abstracting symbolic
material into a form” (Baudrillard, Towards 145). The
mystical character of this form stems from its capacity
to veil its content perpetually. In this political
economy, sign is the equation of the signifier and
signified and also functions both as exchange value and
use value (Baudrillard, Towards 146). Sign form is not
related with contents of material production or the
immaterial contents of signification, in contrast, it
is a code that is obeyed or works by interplay of
signifiers and exchange value. Additionally, he argues
that the fundamental code of the system is not the
18
alienation of contents or any other thing, however,
this code “rationalises and regulate exchange, makes
thing communicate, but only under the law of the code
and through the control of meaning” (Baudrillard,
Towards 147). This system does not mystify the people
but the people are the product of the system, it is the
effect of the system. The sign functions as an agent of
abstraction and the general reduction of all
potentialities, it is a discriminant and “ it
structures itself through exclusion” (Baudrillard,
Towards 149). The scission is not between the sign and
the real, instead it is between the signifier as form
and the signified and referent. Then he criticised the
Barthesian concept of myth as denotation which depends
on the claim of objectivity, instead he see the myth as
a “process of exchange and circulation of a code whose
form is determinant” (Baudrillard, Towards 157).
2.5. A NEW CONCEPT FOR UNDERSTANDING THE PROHIBITION OF
ICONS IN ISLAM: ICON-FORM
Following these arguments I will look into the position
of figural representation in Islamic tradition. I will
engage the arguments of Oleg Grabar and Terry Allen.
While Grabar’s argument is historical, Allen focuses on
19
the objects of utility. I attempt to criticise these
two scholars and then I will offer the concept of icon-
form in the light of the argument that I have
summarised above.
Oleg Grabar in his Formation of Islamic Art,
argues that if we want to determine a critical
historical point in the history of art in Islam, we
should take the year of 634, not before this date (36).
After this date Islamic art began to flourish
throughout the geography that is conquered by the
Islamic Empire. In these times we can see some figural
representations in different areas of Islamic territory
that are Quseyr Amrah, Khirbat al-Mafjar, Kasrul Hayr
etc. His main contribution is that these figures could
be taken as an exception, which is related with the
Western understanding of art.
Grabar claims that the problem of representation
(taswir) is not the core problem of Islam (83).  Then
he turns back to the hadith and ayahs in which he could
not find any clue against representation. He argues
that (I think truly argues that) this is related with
20
idolatry not the representation as such 2. He
differentiates the religious and secular art forms,
then goes on that in religious art forms we can not see
any kind of figural representations. Thus, avoidance of
the figural representations in Islam is very conscious
attitude which stems from the reaction of the Muslims
to the different vocabularies which they use (Grabar
97). He questions how this indifference to
representation turns out to be iconoclasm. His answer
to this question is that the problem arouses from the
impact of Christian iconoclasm on Islam and their
political reaction to Christians not the religious
problem.
Although he very skilfully organises his
arguments, still I think there is a number of problems.
Initially he says that we must not be interested in
theological or philosophical arguments in aniconism.
Thus, Grabar concentrates on the specific historical
and political developments in order to explain
indifference to the icons in Islam. Therefore his
arguments seems to me mostly externalist explications,
which ignore the internal dynamics of Islamic theo-
                                                
2 He gives the example of prophet’s demolition of
idols in Kabah in contrast to painting of Meriam infant
21
ontology. This line of thinking is insufficient if we
want to understand how Islam keeps its distance from
the icons throughout the centuries. There is a
difficulty that arises from the externalist and
historical standpoint.
2.6. IS ANICONISM ENOUGH?
Another important figure who contemplates on this
problem is Terry Allen. He differentiates between two
different attitudes against the figural representation.
In the religious context there are no figural
representation in Islam, whereas in the secular plane
we can see some usage of figural representations (Allen
17).
He argues that early Muslims did not totally
refrain from figural representations and gives the
example of Khirbat al Mafjar. Although Dome of the Rock
was built at the same time there are no figural
representations in this building. He interprets these
two different attitudes as the difference between
religious and secular contexts. Then he claims that
“figural representation has always been a part of
secular art in the Islamic world” (Allen 17).
Additionally, in Islamic world there is no sculpture
                                                                                                                                     
Jesus.
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except a few examples. Figural representations are
always two-dimensional and applied to the objects of
utility (Allen 18).
In the religious settings there may be some
figural representations occasionally but these must not
be for religious purpose. There was no intention to
create icons. Then Allen offers a comparison of the
Byzantine iconoclasm and Islamic aniconism. In
Byzantine iconoclasm, only saints’, God’s and Christ’s
pictures were forbidden, but animate pictures were
possible (Allen 19). In Islam however, there is a
distinction between religious and non-religious subject
matter. This forms the Islamic point of view on figural
representation. This view is therefore not iconoclasm,
but rejection of images and the nonuse of images that
should be called aniconism (Allen 20).
In the case of Byzantine iconoclasm, Emperors
collect the statues but they do not display them
publicly. In Byzantine these images are taken as if
they are real, they are identified with what they
represent. They see them as immanent magical powers.
Hence, when they destroyed these images they are really
23
against their magic, not for religious reasons (Allen
22).
In Arabs, most of their Christian tribes were also
nonfigural, e.g. aniconic. Islam is continuous with
this tradition. Early Islamic aniconism was specific to
the mosque as a new architectural form. This was the
first site of aniconism (Allen 23).
In the case of secular art there was a shift in
the eleventh century, and not in the seventh century.
Allen gives examples from Umayyad and Abbasid palaces,
medals, coins, pottery and specifically books like
Shahnamah. Especially on some portable objects, we can
see figural representations apparently, which seldom
have some explanatory inscriptions (Allen 24-25). In
these portable objects and the stories in the books
there may be emblemizations, although they do not
include identifiable characters like gods, they include
personifications or literary characters (Allen 32).
These emblems are not narratives that only identify the
characters but do not indicate action or setting.
Therefore these Islamic cycles are not narratives but
only emblems. Then he deduces that figural art did not
vanish from the Islamic world but has a different
24
purpose “What disappeared was not figural
representations but the use of figural representation
to show human actions and states of mind” (Allen 33).
Therefore as a supraethnic level of civilisation
mosques remained aniconic, they have no narrative
figural representations. This supraethnic integrative
character of Islamic art was protected by abstract
elements of art (Allen 35). The abstract geometric
forms should be visual and artistic in such a case, and
not the intellectual. It means that “There is no dearth
of secular Islamic figural art, only a dearth of
religious figural art” (Allen 37).
Allen gives examples of figural representation
from Khirbat al-Mafjar. However, as I mentioned above
Grabar considers there as the early example of Islamic
art. For Grabar, they constitute the exception, and not
the rule. Indeed they cannot be accepted as proper
Islamic art.
Allen’s differentiation between ‘portable
objects’, ‘objects of utility’ and other kind of
objects is the conventional classification, which does
not work very well. I gave some arguments on this
subject in the chapter on Baudrillard and Žižek.
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However in order to clarify this problem I will give a
more specific example in Islamic literature which is
known as ‘curtain hadith’. While praying one day the
Prophet suddenly noticed that there are some figures on
the curtain in front of him. He turned to his spouse
Aysha and told her to remove it. Then Aysha removed it
and used it as a cover of pillow. He accepted this
usage. Thus many scholars infer that when the figural
things formed as objects of utility, there is no
problem. This hadith is the basic support of this line
of thought. Nevertheless, can we distinguish an object
of utility and another kind of object? What are the
criteria? As I have discussed above, use-value and
exchange values are like the two sides of a sheet of
paper. This is an analytical distinction like the
difference between signifier and signified.
My last critique is on the difference between
figural representation and non-figural representation,
which I will elaborate in the chapter on Lyotard.
2.7. ICON-FORM
Evaluating these arguments, I will propose a new
concept: icon-form. The importance of this concept
springs from its stress on form not the content. As I
try to expose in Freud, Marx, Žižek and Baudrillard, in
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the systemic structure form is essential. As Marx
argues that no chemist can discover the exchange value
in a diamond or pearl, its value may be found only in
the complex relations of social processes. This is the
core issue in exchange value, which is ignored by
scholars studying the perception of icon in Islam like
Grabar and Allen3.
In Islamic culture, we could find a number of
examples in which there are many kinds of figural
representations that shows the non-restrictions on the
figural representation. However, according to Islamic
Orthodoxy we meet a strict attitude against figural
representations, which constructs the common idea of
Muslims. Consequently, we could find a lot of examples
that supports both approaches. How could we manage with
these opposite arguments in a plausible manner?
I think that these two different contested
attitudes stem from the same metaphysical basis that
has a crude distinction between form and content that
gives priority to the content. Although it seems to be
reasonable, in any systemic structure this line of
                                                
3 For a detailed discussion about the relation
between power, class and representation; (Sarıkartal
145-53).
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thinking does not work. If we analyse the arguments of
Islamic Orthodoxy we see that their problem is related
with the function and form of the icons. Their
hostility against the images relies upon their distance
from paganistic religions and whatever reminds people
paganism4. Thus, the problem arises not from the icons
as such, but from their differential value in the
religious system. The prohibition of the icons (this is
a political and historical phenomena) depends on
conventional arguments that is its reality5.
Although people deny that they perceive the icons
as if they are gods, they perceive the icons as if they
are real. Against their religious beliefs, the logic of
fetishism hegemonizes their daily life. Likewise, in
the case of visual images, Burgin stresses on this
fetishistic fascination and states that “on the one
hand,‘ I know that the (pleasurable) reality offered in
this photograph is only an illusion,’; on the other
hand ‘ I know that this (unpleasurable) reality
                                                
4 John Lowden informs us in Byzantine culture,
people breaks icons and mixes them with water and then
they drink this water. They believe that this water is
holy and gains its power from icon (210).
5 For Baudrillard images have murderous power which
springs from their potentiality of simulacrum
(Simulacra 5-6)
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exists/existed, but nevertheless here there is only
beauty of the print.” (Burgin 190-1).
Thus, I argue that the problem of icons, ie,
figural representations cold be analysed in the
framework of fetishism in which the form is more
primary than the content. Therefore, I haven't stressed
on particular usage of icons, instead I have tried to
theorise different attitudes against images. In such a
case, in the next chapter, I will focus on calligraphy
that cannot be analysed by these two contested
arguments. In calligraphy, because of its undecidable
character, form and content intermingles that cause a
huge confusion.
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3. CALLIGRAPHY AS A SOLUTION FOR THE ICON-FORM
In the absence of the figural representation in
reference with the icon-form, a new kind of
representation form emerged in Islamic geography6.
Roughly speaking, these were the non-representational
art forms that were spread out of the Muslim
civilisation. In the framework of the icon-form, I have
chosen calligraphy, which can be seen as the most
abstract art form. In this chapter, firstly I will
delineate the calligraphy and the nature of the
representation in Islamic culture, its theological
sources, its relation with other religions in reference
with icon-form, its political implications and finally,
as in all closed system, I will try to show its blind
spot by which nonrepresentational claims collapses.
3.1. CALLIGRAPHY AS AN ISLAMIC ART
Oleg Grabar in his significant book about ornamentation
Mediation of Ornament, argues that In Islamic culture,
because of the rejection of mimetic representation,
                                                
6 This does not mean that Muslims tried to develop
alternative forms against painting or any kind of art
forms. However, I am looking at the Islamic culture and
seeing some different forms, which aims to beautiful.
This is not the simple absence-presence game in the
frame of orientalist claims.
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writing is elevated as a principal vehicle of signs of
power and belief (Grabar, Mediation 63). In this
tradition, Calligraphy is seen as the compensation for
the prohibition of representation of human or divine
form (Khatibi 18). It refers to the vision of the
invisible God in Islamic tradition in which the Arabic
language is taken as the miracle of the Qur’an. Grabar
questions the ornamentation by differentiating it from
decoration. In this line of thought, I will especially
focus on his arguments on writing, calligraphy, which
is not merely decoration.  Grabar argues that there are
some letters on different places and can be read a
meaning about it, however, we cannot find the final
meaning or initial purpose about it (Grabar, Mediation
53). In Islamic tradition calligraphy, has a specific
role in the formation of art. In Western tradition
there is also transformation of letters which are
generally in the beginning words by which it functions
as a background in contrast to mimetic representation,
so it has a downgraded role (Grabar, Mediation 53).
Whereas, in Eastern tradition including Chinese, Korean
and Japanese and Islamic calligraphy, aesthetic value
is independent from its meaning (Grabar, Mediation 59).
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First example of the images of the words is the
coins of the seventh century and the inscriptions of
the Dome of the Rock. After the standardisation of the
Arabic alphabet between the middle of seventh century
and the early tenth, new verb khatt was introduced to
the Arabic language, which means calligraphy. This word
means that “to mark out”, “outline” that refers to
“fixing of boundaries between plots to be settled or
built upon” which is used in urban planning (Grabar,
Mediation 66).
In this early period there are some flowers or any
kind of dots, which shows necessary pause in the Qur’an
that seeks to please which are not the calligraphy
(Grabar, Mediation 67). In this process, calligraphy as
a new method is invented by Ibn Muqlah in tenth
century. It’s primary concern was readability.
Following the first example of calligraphy, we see Ibn
al-Bawwab’s Koran (1000-1001) which was well-
proportioned script in which all the semantic and
grammatical pause can be seen very easily.  Grabar
defines this script as follows: “It is a writing that
almost disappears once it has carried its message”
(Grabar, Mediation 72). In this script, there is a huge
difference between ordinary writing and calligraphy.
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After this process, calligraphy followed its own track
for its own sake that signified the explosion of the
writing in all media (Grabar, Mediation 76).
This is the break point of calligraphy after which
its own criteria were developed. Grabar classifies
these criteria in five sections. The first criterion is
related with its technical area, which contains the
storage and the ways of cut. The second criterion is
the artistic creativity that depends on its
originality. In this criterion, writing transcendence
the ordinary writing and creates mimetic
representations. The third criterion is beauty-tahsin,
which is related with the aesthetic enchantment of
writing. Fourthly, its connotative functions appear in
which letters turns out to be the iconographic
transformations like birds or faces. And lastly, its
critical function is developed by which it was seen as
the transmission of message. In this evaluation intent
of calligraphy is God not anyone or anything (Grabar,
Mediation 84-91). Grabar, ultimately, recognised the
aesthetic function of the calligraphy but he is
critical of merely aesthetic evaluations. Thus, he
argues that even though it has beauty, calligraphy
primarily is a vehicle for the holy message.
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Calligraphy has its own sculptural autonomy in
which ‘the dot’ is the simple module of it. Calligraphy
relies on some modules, which are dot, alif and an
imaginary circle, of which alif is a diameter. Both,
the size of the alif and the circle are also determined
by the size of dot. All letters have to follow this
size and proportion (Khatibi 47). Additionally, it adds
some extra things to the meaning of which has three
basic rules that are phonetic, semantic and plastic.
Calligraphy has a number of different styles that
are basically kufic, thuluth, naskhi, Andalusian
maghrib, riq’a, diwani and ta’liq. This is not a simple
decoration, rather it is a relation between language
and writing that creates “singular structure of a
language” (Khatibi 90). As the creation of the relation
of language and writing in the form of image,
Calligraphy is a different form of representation that
glorifies the unseen face of Allah (Khatibi 90).
Calligraphy as an art of linear graphics
visualises the language in the written form (Khatibi
6). It stems from the property of Arabic alphabet that
is written in the play of a horizontal base line and
the vertical lines of its consonants. It is read from
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right to left in which there are diacriticals and loops
that are placed above and below of the base line. It
reveals the “plastic scenography of a text than of a
letter turned into image” (Khatibi 6). Calligraphy
changes the form of the written sign to a decorative
style7. It works in two ways both actual statement and
the composition of images. This movement leads to
recreation of the letter as image in which the literal
or actual meaning is secondary.
There is an iconic transformation in Calligraphy
which results from the nature of Arabic writing style
that is “highly flexible mutual adaptation between the
sign and the image, between the sign and the act of
writing” (Khatibi 7) (see Fig. 1). Analysing
calligraphy and writing, Grabar recourse to Derrida’s
argument on writing. He proposes that writing is the
signifier of the signifier, not the signifier of the
signified. Thus, it is removed from its subject matter
twice (Grabar, Mediation 62). It is different and
excessive from speaking, a game. The primary difference
between writing and sound is time. Although sound is an
immediate medium, writing is eternal.
                                                
7 Remember the Grabar’s critique of ornamentation
and decoration.
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Calligraphy as an art form has its own strict
rules that depends on some geometric rules, by
following these rules it suggests a different kind of
theory of language and writing. When performing as a
language, it also poses a new kind of language in
visual terms that transforms ordinary language into the
divine formula (see Fig. 2) Writing is seen as a high
taste in Islamic culture, in fact, it is also vehicle
of God’s message (Grabar, Mediation 64). In this
transmission every particle of the writing is divine,
besides writing is also holy (Grabar, Mediation 65).
Writing is itself something more than literal form or
transition, rather it is an absolute, an aspect of the
Absolute and “the Absolute, the Sanctum Sanctorum”
(Khatibi 22). For this reason calligraphy is a
religious art and calligraphers are important persons
whose place is Heaven in other world, therefore it is
forbidden to write the Qur’an for non-muslims (Aksel
17).
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There is a huge debate that concentrates on this
point about the property of writing and language in
Islamic theology. The issue focuses on the nature of
divine language whether it is haliq (creator) or mahluq
(created). Through a variety of lenses and approaches
we can reach different political and theological
arguments. Roughly speaking, on the one side we see
Mu’tazila who advocates that the Qur’an was not
composed or created by God at the moment of tanzil. It
is always in God’s mind, so it is eternal. However, it
is created by God before the tanzil (Bennet 125). The
word of God is a form, it is an articulated voice that
has been created by God (Khatibi 29). Thus,
Mu’tazilites cast aside the uncreatedness of the
Qur’an, by which they gave the important role to the
interpretation and reason (Bennet 125). This argument
shakes the divine authority and the power of Ulema
against the secular-imperial authority.  Another
approach that is defended by Asharites, proposes that
reading the text, pronouncing is created but the Qur’an
itself is uncreated. It is timeless and divine. If we
separate God’s word and God, tawhid is in danger
(Bennet 126). They affirm that the paper, the ink or
any kind of material is created, but the speech of God
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is uncreated. The main representators of this argument
are Ibn Hazm, Ibn Jinni and Ibn Fari who suggested that
“their grammar is based on the revealed, uncreated
nature of the Qur’an, thus discarding the thesis of
Mu’tazila, for major metaphysical reasons” (Khatibi
31). Their arguments that form the orthodoxy have five
basic principles. Briefly, these are: Firstly, the
Qur’an is co-eternal with God. Secondly, to create is
to utter, to articulate. Bodily senses of man are
delimited by Allah. Language ascends upon him as a
revelation. Thirdly, language signifies and presupposes
knowledge, and this is accorded by Allah. The ultimate
source of language is divine. Its later developments
may be the human activity. Forthly, diversity of
language results from a primary unity, the language of
Adam. And finally, status of writing derives from the
Qur’an, (Khatibi 31-33).
But lurking behind these debates we can shed light
on the issue from a different angle. If all of the
elements of the Qur’an except the word of Allah are
created this means that writing is also created. Hence,
writing is seen as a human activity in which we see a
more free space for performance. Although there are
some restrictions on the representation of the human
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form and the representation of God who is veiled from
human understanding, in the writing we can reach more
freedom. This writing, Calligraphy, depends on the
exact proportion, which is the precondition of its
beauty and its text’s legibility. However, it does not
mean that Calligraphy is mere geometry, it is something
more than that (Khatibi 46). (see Fig. 3)
In this specific case, even though Calligraphy is
a kind of writing, it depends on recognition, not the
reading. It needs to decipher some kind of rhetorical
figures. Reading of the Calligraphy is not a simple,
linear reading, it is a recognition of the permutation
of different letters. Khatibi defines this recognition
as an echo without an ultimate destiny:
It emanates from language and returns to it,
coming and going, as it were, at one remove
from it. The mind takes pleasure in this
paradoxical approach to the written line: in
this calligraphic is rendering one reads only
what one already knows. But perhaps this is
the principle behind all imaginative language
in its written form, such that the meaning is
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a sort of optical illusion, skimming across a
celestial prism. (Khatibi 91)
This reading problem, dual character of writing is
not specific to the Calligraphy, but it contains all
kinds of writing. Bill Readings thinks that  “writing
is reduction of difference to opposition, the
flattening of space into an abstracted system of
recognisable oppositions between units which owe their
differential value to opposition rather than
motivation” (41). Thus linear reading collapses in the
case of Calligraphy, -and also writing. Calligraphy is
not a mere geometric or formalistic thing; it is a
sacred text and the celebration of the divine that has
its own music (Khatibi 117).
While thinking on the origin of the writing and
art, Andre Leroi-Gourhan emphasizes this point and
tries to show the relationship between writing, art and
religion (188). By criticising the conventional
arguments on the origin of writing in which graphic
representation is taken as the “naïve representation of
reality”, Leroi-Gourhan argues that the beginning of
writing (in the broadest sense), graphism depends on
abstraction (Leroi-Gourhan 188). In contrast to our
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perception of writing, which is an abstract form, he
stresses on the relationship between figurative art and
the language. Figurative art is closely connected with
language, so throughout the four thousand years of
linear writing, we have accustomed to this separation
between art and writing (Leroi-Gourhan 192). While
giving some examples from some Indian and Inuit tribes’
ideograms, he proposes that these are done after they
met with literate people. Ultimately, writing that we
use today is a particular type of writing, linear
writing, which is an impediment on the abstraction
(Leroi-Gourhan 196).
Following Leroi-Gourhan’s arguments, we may offer
that calligraphy as a writing system can break this
naïve linear writing. Although there are some direct
representations, calligraphy generally relies on the
abstraction of the theological and aesthetic values.
(see Fig. 4-5)
The main mistake of Calligraphy appears in this
crux, in which it is taken as an pre-abstract form of
representation in contrast to the Western art that is
representational and figurative (Khatibi 128). On the
contrary, it “imitates the forms of real objects and
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makes use of the shapes of men and animals” and
symbolises the  “cosmic harmony and the perfection of
God” that unconcealed the hidden beauty of Allah
(Khatibi 129).
 Another problematic issue of the Calligraphy and
writing is the futuhat that covers the problem of
isolated letters in the Qur’an. These are the beginning
letters of surahs like Alif, Lam, Mim, which are
totally arbitrary which form the secret of the Qur’an
(Khatibi 139). These are signs of sublime. By which,
Calligraphy depicts the soul, which leads to the voyage
of celebration that comes from the anguish of the
believer, of Muslim artist who cannot delineate the
Invisible. Finally, we can conclude that the strength
of Calligraphy is related with its property, which
depends on not the reading but looking without reading.
Thus it empties the letter from its context, from its
original written form that creates the dual character
in writing by which the letters can be read as both
signs and images (Khatibi 214, 219). (see Fig.5)
3.2. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FACE OF THE UNSEEN
Calligraphy as a particular mode of expression in Islam
stems from its own sign regimes, which forms the source
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of Islamic hermeneutics. In this track, Hamid Dabashi
elaborates the problematic of the prohibition of the
Face in Islamic tradition in reference to its onto-
theological background. Unlike the western tradition,
the sign is absent in Islamic tradition. Because of not
having the face, God is unseen in Islam, therefore we
can only talk about the presence of the Unseen (Dabashi
128). Absenting the Face, the Qur’anic narrative begins
in the name. Instead of this absence of the Face of the
Unseen, we are faced with the name of the Unseen. There
is a mutation from the Sign to the Signifier, which
points to ‘One Final Signified’ and a ‘Hermeneutic
Centre’. There is Citation instead of Sightation, sign
is suppressed, the Qur’an speaks to the ears not to the
eyes. Muslim Faith starts from the absence of the Face,
because Face is de-Faced (Dabashi 129).  Thus the
Qur’an suggests the Signifier which is Unseen (ghayab).
This Signifier, that is, name, cannot be seen. The
names of letters like Alif, Lam, Mim refer to nothing
beyond themselves. These are the pseudo-Signs, which
are feigning the Sign. These can be read as signatures
of the Unseen. (Dabashi 130). Alif, Lam, Mim are
neither Signs nor Signifies. The first condition of the
Faith is to believe in this un-Face and Unseen.
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Ghayab refers to something, which is hidden from
the eyes, but visible in the heart. Unseen cannot be
seen by eyes, can be felt by hearts (Dabashi 131).
There are only some alphabetical signifiers in the
absence of Sign. This practice prefers the Sound not
the Sight, Voice not the Vision, and Ear not the Eye.
There is a “sound simulacrum of the Sign” (Dabashi
132).
In such a case, no figural representation is
possible, no face can be presented. Hence, the meaning-
less Sign turned out to be a meaningful Signifier.
However, there is a lot of hidden Signified in this
Signifier which creates the origin of the Qur’anic
Hermeneutics and Islamic onto-theology (Dabashi 133).
This is the main difference between Islamic
tradition and Christian tradition in which there is no
physical manifestation of the Unseen like Christ.
Christian theology always studies on the figure of
Christ as a Sign, but Islamic God is an absent
presence, which sublimates God from any anthropomorphic
affiliation (Dabashi 176, fn4).
Face is rejected as the site Identity in Islam.
There is a strategic mutation in this position; “Sign
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mutated) to the Signature (sighted) to the Signifier
(celebrated) to the Signified (implicated) (Dabashi
136). The mere visibility of any Face functions as the
reminder of the absence of the One Face. Everything
that we see is His Face actually. Dabashi in this
corner criticises Husserl and Derrida who assume that
Sign universally signates. According to Dabashi,
however, it is not the signs but the signifiers, which
signify. Signs stand for nothing other than themselves.
If a sign signifies something other than itself, it is
turned out into a signifier.
Dabashi highlights the story of Joseph in the
Qur’an and claims that when Joseph smashes the idols,
he de-faces them. Idolatry is the insistence on the
visible Sign but it is impossible. Joseph’s face in
this case is the face of the Unseen, so this story
narrates the return of the repressed in the Qur’anic
narrative (Dabashi 153). (see Fig.6)
This transition from the sign into the Signifier,
also means that the transition from pagan community to
monotheistic ummah. This is the crux of the problem.
The primacy of the Sign is the persistence of
polytheism in contrast to the insistence of the absence
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of the Divine Face, which implicates the One Unseen as
the Transcendental Signified. The Name of Allah is the
Transcendental Signifier to which “all Signs and
Signifiers point” (Dabashi 157). The Unseen manifests
itself not as Sign but in Words. The main problem with
this seeing and sign is the prophet’s visitation of God
that is known as miraj. However, there is a huge debate
in this visitation about which majority of the Islam
philosophers think that Mohamed saw God while dreaming
or imagined him in the heart.
This transformation is the “manifesto of
globalizing abstraction of particulars, from tribal to
Cosmic, from Patrimonial Gemeinschaft to Patriarchal
Gesellschaft, the local iconic deities with
identifiable Faces and as recognizable Signs yield
collectively to a Supreme Abrahamic Monotheism.”
(Dabashi 166). There is a transition from local to
universal. This is the transformation of the iconic
semiotics to the textual hermeneutics by which visible
signs turn into the verbal signifiers. This is the new
“Metaphysical Economy of Signification” and the
“Universal Globalization of the Sacred” (Dabashi 168).
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Dabashi maintains that Islam is the Global
Universalisation of the Judaic particular. Visual focus
changed into the audible logos. And also this change
has very crucial political implications. Islam, in its
battle with Christianity as two different competing
universalisations, deploys the Judaic narrative as its
paradigm (Dabashi 171). The violent anti-paganism of
the Islam signifies the cry of New Order against
Byzantines and Sassanids.
In this battle the Sign has failed and Face is
veiled: “God speaks, Gabriele conveys, Mohamed listens,
repeats, and then writes. Because God speaks with His
Voice but Teaches with the pen” (Dabashi 173).
Read. And thy Lord is the Most Bounteous,
Who teaceth by the pen,
Teachteh man that which he knows not.
-The Qur’an 96. 3-5
Finally according to Dabashi, spoken word is not
privileged over the written here. Thus, the Qur’an
represses and resurrects the Sign in the shape of
written word while taking it as “the simulacrum of the
repressed Sign” (Dabashi 174). The Written Word, the
Book, the Signifier counterfeits the Sign. This is the
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final manifesto of the Qur’an, which is the miracle of
the Muslim Faith in the absence of the Face.
3.3. TRACKING THE FOOTSTEPS OF JUDAISM
By following Dabashi’s arguments on the
universalisation of Judaist particular in Islam, I will
recourse to Lyotard’s accounts on Judaism in the case
of vision and figure. The reason why I prefer his
argument is not solely Dabashi’s claims but also
Lyotard’s comparison of Judaism and paganism, which is
the core problem in icon-form.
In his article “Figure Disclosed”, Lyotard
compares two different culture, one is symbolised on
the identity of Moses which is Judaism, the other is
the savage culture which is represented by Socrates.
Savage cultures are constructed on mythology and
phantasies, on the other hand Judaism is an effort to
escape from myths (Lyotard 70). Savage culture gives an
importance to the figure instead of discourse, by
contrast Judaism gives priority to discourse. In
Judaism this priority of discourse leads to prohibition
of making an image of God which is an abstract idea
that supports the triumph of intellectuality over
sensuality (Lyotard 72). However, these two are
interdependent in the case of object-representation.
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Conception of consciousness does not rely on simply the
perception of object; rather, consciousness is the sum
of the thing-representation of object and word-
representation of the object.
In reference to Freud’s Dream-work, Lyotard argues
that dreams are not basically a discourse or image but
a matrix. In dreams, “the content of the dream or its
latent thoughts are hidden in its form” (Lyotard 73).
This argument implies that content of a dream is not a
discourse, but it is a form, a fantasy. In this
differentiation, there is a clear-cut division between
discourse and figure that is not true. In the case of
Judaism, the priority of the logos expels all
figuration, nevertheless in the case of Greeks art and
savagery reconciles the discourse and figure in the
form of fantasy (Lyotard 78).
The other couple connected to the same problem is
magic and science. The problem relies on the property
of magic, which transforms the word-presentation
(signification) to the thing-presentation
(designation). The word has a huge power in the magic
and a separate act. When you say ‘horse’, the horse
appears. This does not guarantee the distinction
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between discourse and figure, by contrast it implies
that there is a strict bound between them which
guarantees the rationality. Again in reference to
Freud, for Lyotard word-presentation of the object
eliminates the thing-presentation of the object that
causes a distortion of language that can be called
schizophrenia (Lyotard 79). The thing has to be kept in
the sight, therefore whenever we talk about
signification we have to talk about designation. This
thing-presentation can not be eliminated. Thus, the two
mistakes appear in this context, schizophrenic mistakes
things for words, science mistakes word for things
(Lyotard 80). Hence, we can conclude that the
relationship between discourse and its object is
constantly changing. In this axis, Judaism promotes the
discourse without thing, and totemism is the opposite.
In Judaism thing-presentation is absent, in totemism
word-presentation is absent.
The Jew is the man of the book; the savage is the
man of the idol. There is another opposition in such a
case: sight and hearing. The man of the book defends
the text, as well as ear. The intelligible text has no
plastic value in itself (Lyotard 82). This is truly
invisible because it has an absent locutor. The spirit
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is the frame of signification. Thus, the text does not
target the eye, this invisibility of God is not the
imperfection. “The eyes must be closed if the word is
to be heard” (Lyotard 82). In Judaism, hearing is
dominant which is related with metaphysics. In
contrast, in totemic religion there is always a real
locutor and a potential listener both are subjected to
the same law (Lyotard 83). In Judaism this denial of
sight is at the same time a denial of designation.
There is the transcendence of the readable over the
visible. This reader has no land at all, so it is
dominated by absence not by the presence (Lyotard 85).
This is the birth of men of discourse.
This opposition appears also in the distinction
between maternity related with evidence of senses and
paternity that is a hypothesis. The father is a voice
and not a figure, He is not situated in the visible
world (Lyotard 85). There is an articulation between
mother and sight in this area that is seen when she is
absent that creates visibility for man.  Unlike mother,
father is invisible. He belongs to the different order,
the order of discourse and transcendental (Lyotard p,
86). This creates a symbolic power of the father whose
position is name-giver that is related with the word,
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invisibility. There is an opposition between discourse
and fantasy.
Then Lyotard focuses on the foreclosure, which is
the concept of Freud (Verwerfung) that means operation
of rejection. (Lyotard 88). In contrast to Freud, Lacan
interprets this concept as:
effects specific to each mode of rejection:
the repressed is not excluded from the mental
apparatus; it finds its place in the
unconsciousness, and it is so worked upon
(displacement, condensation, transposition of
both the instinctual representative and its
quota of affect) as to be able to enter into
the symbolic of the unconscious. (Lyotard 88)
According to Freud, repression is the “withdrawal
of cathexis from the word-presentation of the object
together with the cathecting of the thing-presentation”
(Lyotard 88). In such a case, unconscious can not be
articulated in the discursive language. Although it is
both present and non-representable, it is present as a
figure (form or image), so it is non-representable in
words. We can deduce that dreamwork can not be
articulated in the text; “Rejected element is present
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in the scenario as a visible thing, but it is absent as
an audible word. Its visible presence is, nonetheless,
not simply an image; it too is arranged according to a
certain order” (Lyotard 88).
Moreover, Freud sees dream as form rather than a
structure (language). Verbalisation is the main
precondition of the consciousness. Thus, figure
(silence) captures the energy. The opposition of
Figuration and Signification appears in that relation
in which figuration is a less elaborated mode of
thinking than discourse and signification relies on a
tightly organised diacritical space (Lyotard 89). It
means that in repression the object is not excluded
from the psychic system but is included within it as a
figure (a thing-representation). The figure is the
rejected element, which is always present in the
system.
There is a parallelity between dreams and
schizophrenia, both treats word as though they were
things (Lyotard 93). In schizophrenia the figure does
not appear, it is never an image:
Words are indeed treated like things, but
they are so treated in so far as they are
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signifiers and not designators, as they are
in dreams, where operations consist primarily
of putting thing-representations in the place
of word-presentations. (Lyotard 94)
Hence, there is the predominancy of the text in
the Jewish teachings. Hearing is a sense of being
encountered, of the distance being abolished, refusal
to speculate which creates the foreclosure.  The ear
listens to writing that is the word of the dead father.
Sense of hearing is conceived as more intellectual,
closer to the mental processes than vision (Lyotard
96). The basic difference between the savage culture
and Judaism is that writing is as different from savage
ritual as absence is from presence, but also as
articulated language is from gesture (Lyotard 98).
Lyotard define this problem in reference to Levinas:
Levinas describes the desire of the West as a
wish to know, and the wish to know as an
avoidance of responsibility, as a flirtation
with the known in which the knowing subject
‘never gets his fingers burned’: for Judaism,
knowledge is temptation, and the wish to know
is a temptation to temptation, and wish to
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know is a temptation to temptation, whereas
the righteous relationship to the law is an
obligation to reply by doing: ‘ One accepts
the Torah before one knows it…. Hearing a
voice which speaks to you means, ipso facto,
accepting that you have an obligation to him
who speaks.’ (Lyotard 99)
Finally, the signification-presentation and the
designation-presentation are in contact with one
another in the austerity of truth.
3.4. VISION AT THE CROSSROADS OF DISCOURSE AND FIGURE
At this juncture, I will return Lyotard’s argument on
figure and discourse from a different angle.
Nevertheless, firstly I will attempt to depict the
theoretical framework of the vision and its relation of
the text. Nowadays we watch rather read said Mitchell
while defining modern times as ‘pictorial’ times
(Picture 11). After the linguistic turn, we are faced a
new era that is defined as ‘pictorial turn’ by him. In
modern times we cannot separate the visual and verbal
representations and their relations to the political
struggles (Mitchell, Picture 3). After the ‘pictorial
turn’, picture can be taken as the complex interplay
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between “visuality, apparatus, institutions, discourse,
bodies and figurality”(Mitchell, Picture 16).
In the same line, but in a different context
Norman Bryson supports Mitchell’s ideas on the
relationship between discourse and figure. Bryson
primarily stresses on the genesis of the images in the
West where it is permitted only for the fulfilment of
“the office of communicating the Word to the
unlettered” (Bryson 1). Thus a sign has to be a twofold
thing, one is signifier that is connected with the
graphic material, and the other is signified related
with intelligible (Bryson 3). Avoiding the sweeping
generalisations, Bryson argues that every single image8
is made up from the composition of discursive and the
figural in different degrees. In some examples
discursive may supreme, in other cases figural may
supreme (Bryson 5)9. Hence, language enormously forms
and delimits our reception of images.
                                                
8 This should be read as any kind of visual
material such as writing or painting.
9 Bryson uses a model in order to show the degree
of discourse and figure in images (Bryson 255 fn 31):
Glyph, sigil    Discursivity
Hieroglyph, ideogram
Canterbury window
Masaccio
Piero
Still-life
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He thinks that dichotomy between figure and
discourse repeats the old dichotomy between Meaning and
Being that does not work well (Bryson 7). Because of
the historical and changing character of ‘Real’, pure
‘being-as-image’ is impossible. Consequently, it is
impossible the image is like ‘Life’ in which
information constitutes excess (Bryson 10-11). The main
reason of the distinction between discourse and figure
is the result of the perspective in painting, by which
realists or naturalists try to efface this interplay,
instead of it they attempt to construct a new
distinction between image and world that guaranties
their safety position as a painter (Bryson 12-13).
3.5. FISCOURSE, DIGURE
Lyotard’s distinction between discursive and the
figural is the main outline of his article “Fiscourse
Digure”. Discursive signification implies the meaning
on the one hand, rhetoricity implies the figure on the
other hand (Lyotard 344). In the discursive meaning
Lyotard claims that it is something which is related
with the representation by concepts that organises the
                                                                                                                                     
Vermeer
(Cubism)
Abstract Expressionism
Painterly trace Figurality
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objects of knowledge as a system of concepts (Readings
3). In this line of thought Ferdinand de Saussure
appears as a significant figure. In Saussure’s system,
textual space is discursivized by the language that
reduces all meanings to the play between signifiers.
The same process was operated in the Renaissance
perspective in which all visible was discursively
reduced to the representable. Against this
reductionism, Lyotard insists upon the figural which is
not simply the other of the discursive space:
Figural opens discourse to a radical
heterogeneity, a singularity, a difference
which cannot be rationalised or subsumed
within the rule of representation…. The
object resists being reduced to the state of
mere equivalence to its meaning within a
system of signification, and the figural
marks this resistance, the sense that we
cannot ‘say’ everything about an object, that
an object always in some sense remains
‘other’ to any discourse we may maintain
about it, has a singularity in excess of any
meanings we may assign to it. (Readings 4)
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In this perspective, the figural creates a
heterogenous space and co-exists with the textual
(Lyotard, Fiscourse 344). Furthermore, the graphic
letter has a plastic force in the textual space, which
performs an arbitrary conceptual demarcation of space.
Thus, we could see that the discursive always
necessarily interweaves with the figural and vice
versa, even though it asserts to accurate or full
representation rests upon the repression of figurality
(Readings 5). By the help of this figural critique,
Lyotard also criticise Derrida because of his ignorance
of the figural function of the non-textual. Derrida in
his textual analysis could not notice that “the
sensible field of vision functions as a figure for
‘textual space’.”. Nonetheless, this is not totally
Derrida’s fault, rather his followers participate and
aggrandise this fault as wrongly interpreting his motto
‘There is nothing outside the text’. Lyotard interprets
this motto as “nothing is ever wholly external or
internal to effects of textuality” (Readings 156 fn4).
There is always a figural other to textuality which
functions within and against the text. Additionally,
Derrida’s assertion of putting language everywhere
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fills the holes of metaphysics, which ignores the
sensible, and jouissance. Derrida consider that the
visible is a halt within language that is the product
of the uncontrollable forces of signifiers. Lyotard
again criticises this argument and pronounce that
“language simultaneously draws on two heterogenous
negations: that of opposition (text) in signification
and that of heterogenous difference (vision) in
reference” (Readings 6).
In order to criticise textuality, Lyotard applies
Merleu-Ponty’s arguments on vision by which he attempts
to exhibit how vision deconstructs the structural
linguistics on which semiology is constructed. This
argument does not imply the pure figurality, in
contrast it tries to display the three-dimensional
plastic space of two-dimensional textual space, which
gives priority of the readable over visible (Readings
7). Figure and discourse are taken as necessarily and
impossibly co-present, as constitutive and disruptive
of representation. Then Lyotard’s neologism can be seen
in this crux in which he offers new concepts digure
that means discursive in the figural, and fiscourse
that means figural in the discursive (Readings 7). He
introduces the visible to the structural linguistics
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not as a different or an alternative space but as a
necessary and heterogenous complement to the textual.
Lyotard compares two different traditions; one is
structural linguistics, which gives priority to the
textual, and the other is phenomenology, which gives
priority to the visible. In structural linguistics,
language is seen as differential and systemic structure
in which we can not talk about the reference. Language
is constructed with the structure of oppositions that
creates the textuality (Readings 9-11). However, this
textual space is flat and two-dimensional according to
Lyotard. This space is the space of pure opposition. As
an opponent of this argument, Lyotard presents Merleu-
Ponty and phenomenology.
Merleu-Ponty offers us to see how the Seeing Eye
participates the visible world not as only as a passive
perceptor. The eye has to move in order to see the
world (Merleu-Ponty 35-39). This understanding of the
Seeing Eye assumes a corporeal involvement that is
summarised by Merleu-Ponty as  “chiasmatic imbrication
of subject and object in perception” (qtd in Readings
11). Despite Merleu-Ponty’s insistence upon
corporeality of the eye, Cartesian optics supposes that
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the eye is the virtual point of the reception of light
and the precise complement of the vanishing point in
perspectival construction. This means that what we see
is only what we look at and this relates vision with
the eye movement (Readings 12). Hence, visibility is
understood as an act of perception not a passive act in
which subject and object come together. Therefore, the
visible is working as figure in the structural
linguistics, textuality functions as a figure in the
phenomenological understanding of perception (Readings
12).
Lyotard thinks in the same line about the
differentiality of the language but this is only one
part of the issue. If the problem is considered only
with this side, plasticity of the line in the letter is
ignored. Lyotard rejects the idea of the reference,
which is taken as a mere signification in the
structural linguistics that is a reduction (Readings
12). This signification overcomes the difference of
exteriority:
1- that the difference of referential
exteriority cannot be reduced to and
signified by an opposition;
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2- that this radical heterogeneity is a
necessary condition of signification by
oppositions. This is because the non-
linguistic, the distance of reference, is
both the other of discourse and its condition
of possibility. (Readings 14)
Reference introduces the non-linguistics into the
discourse however; in the signification it exists
solely with the absence of language. In fact, it is the
silent alterity of objects at the edge of discourse
that negates the language externally that is lost in
signification (Readings 15). Signification by nature
keeps the things in the conceptual structure of
discourse as signified values. So, reference works as a
negation of the language and creates another kind of
space that is visible in the pure absence of language
(Readings 15). Reference in the language is
incommensurable with the oppositional negation that
points outside itself by which heterogeneity of the
visual enters to the linguistic system.
On the contrary, designation is the “indication of
the ‘here and now’ by deixis” in which ‘here’ cannot be
reduced to the signification. Designation is the point
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on which the structural linguistics is failed because
of its movement outside of itself. Designation is
something, which enters textual space as the figural
(Readings 16). Linguistics ignores both referential and
designatory function of language.
On this basis, figural space appears inside
textuality in two ways: ”as motivation and continuity
between elements, and depth and opacity for element
themselves.” (Readings 18). Saussure is not interested
in the plastic value of the graphic letter, its
importance comes from its oppositional graphic
distinction. Letter is taken as a “pure transparent
code which is determined by the oppositions.” And is
disembodied from its shape. Lyotard’s crucial critique
targets this understanding. For him, the line that
creates the letter is seen rather than read. The letter
is not an arbitrary mark, in fact it is a figure. This
lens (structural linguistics) excludes vision as a
function of eye.  The line in the textual space
indicates the visuality, which evokes unreadability
that is the condition of the recognition. The line is
not a concept but a pure plastic shape. The condition
of possibility of the mental representation depends on
the forgetting of the line (Readings 19). Textual space
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is possible only with this figure that is always
forgotten and reduced to the opposition. However, it is
impossible to reduce the letter to its literal
function. Nevertheless, the letter is the rhetorical
excess over literal meaning in which it functions as
figural. There is always “figural coexistence of the
plastic and the textual, of the line and the letter”
(Readings 20). The figural is the other of the
representation not a different representation and it
introduces the heterogenous into the representation
that is the pure negative of representation (Readings
20). The figural blocks the togetherness of
heterogenous spaces, which is not the outside, or the
beyond of representation and language. It is the
indispensable and impossible encounter with its other
that can not be represented (Readings 22). This is the
event which is immemorial but cannot be forgotten or
remembered. This other is rejected both by semiotic and
phenomenology. It does not represent the
unrepresentable but always reminds us that there is
something other than representation (Readings 24).
Thus, Lyotard argues that Renaissance perspective
or Cartesian optics is the ‘textualization’ of the
visual that reduces the vision to the simple affair of
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geometry (Readings 25-26). This perspective immobilises
the eye that leads to the flat visual field around a
focal centre in which visible is taken as a stable
image on the transparent screen, whereas there is
always heterogenous space in representation. Lyotard
exemplifies this heterogeneity with the anamorphosis in
Holbein’s painting of Ambassadors. In anamorphosis,
there is co-existence of at least two different mode of
representation. In this example, Lyotard manifests the
difference between pluralism and deconstruction, in
pluralism there are number of different focal points,
however; in deconstruction “our choice of focal point
makes a difference” (Readings 26).
3.5. PLASTICITY OF THE LETTER: SINGULARITY IN LANGUAGE
Peki bize ne olurdu , eğer bu iş bize
açıklansaydı, arada perde olmaksızın,
Kuşkusuz desteğim o işe olurdu.
Hem bu dünyada mutsuzluk gelirdi başımıza
Hem de kıyamet gününde diriliş anımızda
Fakat bağışlayıcı Tanrı bizi mutlu etmek için,
Düşmanların aşırı isteklerine rağmen, perdeler
koydu araya
(Ibn-i Arabi 51)
Ibn-i Arabi is one of the most influential Islamic
mystics who have some specific ideas on letters which
are very similar to Lyotard’s arguments on discourse
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and figure. In the case of calligraphy, I will recourse
to his authentic ideas as a representative of the
Islamic tradition. Arabi divides the letters into three
which are written letters (huruf-un rakamiyye), vocal
letters (huruf-un lafziyye) and cognitive letters
(huruf-un mustahzara) (Ibn-i Arabi 56). Vocal letters
are present in the form of name, whereas written
letters are not. Cognitive letters are both written and
vocal letters imagined in the mind. If one person has
not the imagination of one letter in his mind, he can
not use that letter.
Letters are the basis of our life in the world
because all the world is created by the enunciation of
these letters with the order of “be” (Kun) (Ibn-i Arabi
58). Every letter has its own peculiarities, has
singularities, which signifies different meanings. The
properties of the letters do not merely stem from their
beings or context but also stem from their forms and
shapes. Every letter has its own shape and this
differentiates it from others. If one talking about the
properties of the alif, are cannot disregard its length
and shape that basically determine the properties of
the alif. (see Fig. 7)
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Written letters are visible letters, which are
perceived by the eye. Once a letter is present, its
spirit is also created (Ibn-i Arabi 58). If one letter
exists lonely, its spirit is different from the same
letter’s composite shape from three letters. Because
one spirit governs only one form, therefore; if there
is another form, there must be a different spirit. If
this spirit goes away, then the letter dies and passes
away to the other world. The death of a form is also
death of its letter.
Vocal letters are formed in the air. It is
perceived by ear. The spirits of these kinds of letters
are formed in vocal forms, which exist in the letters.
When its aim is finished, these letters do not die and
continue to live in the air (Ibn-i Arabi 59). These
letters are immortal but only special people can see
them (Al-sahib al Kasf).
 Cognitive letters are also immortal which are in
the world of Berzah. They are initially formed in mind
then they appear.
Letters are also having their own ummah. They have
their own prophets among them and also have some
responsibilities to God. They have proper names like
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humans and their world is most apparent and transparent
world in the universe. They also have their own law
(shariah) and pray with this law (Ibn-i Arabi 96). They
have a hierarchy among themselves: some letters are the
most valuable (havass al-havass), the others valuable
(havass) and there are also normal (awam).
Ibn-i Arabi poses an important question, which
seems to be specific to Arabic language: Why is the
word surah written by letter sin instead of sad
although both of them have nearly same voice? This is
the secret of letters. Because their destinies and
their purposes are different. If we use the same letter
in two different words, these letters should also have
different purposes and different destinies (Ibn-i Arabi
192).
Lastly, Ibn-i Arabi concentrates on the secret of
Alif Lam Mim. Why did God say only Alif Lam Mim, and
why did He not explain the meaning of these ayahs? He
discusses this problem entirely and concludes that we
can not know God and how and why He created them. God
can be known only by His properties not by His own
entity. Thus, we have to concentrate on the properties
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of God and letters are the main agents of this
adventure.
In this debate, we can clearly notice the parallel
ideas between Ibn-i Arabi and Lyotard. When Ibn-i Arabi
mentions the singularities and properties of the
letters, he focuses on the importance of the plasticity
of the letter. If the same letter has a different
spirit when it is used in a different composition, this
is not the same letter. This exposes the visual
singularity of the letter, which transgresses the flat
dimension of structuralism. Furthermore, every letter’s
properties depend on its shape in addition to its
literal meaning. This also transgresses the meaning and
pierces the form into text (see Fig.8). This argument
will build my last argument on icon-form and
calligraphy.
3.6. IMITATIO VERSUS MIMESIS
Sayın, in her book, Noli Me Tangere: Beden Yazısı II,
differentiates the re-presentation and the imitatio in
the case of Islamic Art. Furthermore, she maintains and
proposes to elaborate a bit further this
differentiation with special attention to the nature of
imitatio, by which she differentiates imitatio from
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mimesis (16).  Sayın defines the imitatio as an act,
which refers to a concrete signifier. In contrast to
imitatio, mimesis is an act, which does not have a
referable signifier. Mimesis does not represent the
things but it tries to be that thing, it is an act of
being. Nevertheless, mimesis is not free from the
representation because in the moment of mimesis it is
standing for the object it tries to mime (18).
Mimesis is closely related with the
phenomenological vision, unlike representation, which
depends on perspective.  Thus, perspective
(representation-imitatio) constructs a hierarchical
space and tries to dominate the world it represents
(Sayın, Öykünme 15). Mimesis desires to be the thing it
mimes. It does not have the will to power, rather it
desires to be passive thing or the part of the mimed.
It is not in front of the world but it is in the world
(Sayın, Öykünme 15). In mimesis, there is no linear
perception that lies in the canvas, however it has
diachronic perceptions (Sayın, Öykünme 19). It does not
speak for the nature, it tries to be the part of the
nature. It mises the missed condition with the power of
repetition (Sayın, Öykünme 20).
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Throughout the Middle Age, in the West, mimesis
had been taken as imitatio. Nonetheless, in Islamic
culture, the idea of the impossibility of the
representation of God leads to the concept of mimesis.
This impossibility was turned out to be the attempt on
the part of God or the internalization of God, which
deteriorates the subject-object dichotomy (146). In
this frame Sayın defines the mimetic image as negative
signifier of the non-signified sign (148). This mimesis
is equal with the praying which bridges God and the
thing. In such a case, Islamic art is not the art as
such but a kind of glorification of God. The aim of the
art is not the representation of God but to be the part
of God. Thus, Islamic art does not forbid the icons. It
does not recognise them; it degrades them because of
their powerlessness and reality claims.
3.7. CALLIGRAPHY AS OBJET a
Finally, I try to locate calligraphy as a
particular art form in Islamic tradition. Calligraphy
always aims to the non-representational representation
of God in the Absence of the Face of the Unseen. Its
position is very close to the objet a in Lacan’s
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paradigm. I have recourse to Elizabeth Grosz for being
accurate in such a difficult position.
Lacan differentiates the drive from instinct.
Unlike instincts, drives are not the biological things
or natural processes. Lacan formulates this
differentiation as: “the drive has no day or night, no
spring and autumn, no rise and fall. It is a constant
force” (qtd in Grosz 74).
The drive needs a satisfaction, however, the
‘object’ which provides this satisfaction is not the
object of the drive “It is always a divergence, a
metonym, a lack of real, displaced onto a substitute.
The object of satisfaction is the object a. The objet a
is not the drive’s objekt, but the cause of desire.”
(Grosz 75).
The source of the drive is always the erotogenic
rim, orifice or a cut, which is a threshold between
interior and exterior. However, for the satisfaction of
the desire this object may fill the gap, but it does
not satisfy it.
The drive seeks an object in order to satisfy its
bivalent aims by filling this gap or lack. However,
this lack is always an essential lack that can not be
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filled by any object.  In order to gain satisfaction,
drive substitutes any object, thus; “the drive is the
field in which desire is manifested” (Grosz 76).
Distinguishing the aim and goal Lacan constructs
his distinction between drive and instinct, “The objet
a is impossible to incorporate, but also impossible to
sever. It hovers between the self and the other. The
divergence of the goal from the aim is what
distinguishes the drive from the instinct; it renders
the objet a into an imaginary object” (Grosz 77). Thus,
we can conclude that satisfaction of the drive is
possible without reaching its goal. The aim is always a
return that is gained by replacing the lost object with
its parts.
In some process of the drive, the subject detaches
part of itself from itself. But this movement returns
to the subject’s body. This return movement is possible
under the condition that the objet a is not the Real
object, it is defined by Lacan as; ”a process of a
hollow, a void which can be occupied … by any object”
(qtd in Grosz 78). This absence of the real object can
be produced only through the other.
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In the case of voyeurism, the voyeur looks at what
cannot be seen. The real, the fundamental aim here is
the desire of the other. Thus, the drive is located
between the eye and the gaze. This forms the
distinction between gaze and vision (Grosz 78). Seeing
is the function of the singular looking point of the
subject, which is located outside itself. Hence, the
possibility of being observed is primary in the gaze
(Grosz 79). The gaze is outside the subject’s control
that comes from the field of the Other. It is the
Other’s gaze. The object of the gaze is the objet a.
This relation between objet a and the drive is
clear. Objet a signifies the permanent gap which
impossible to fill, only partial satisfaction is
possible. Calligraphy can be seen in the same status
with objet a that signifies a lack that is the Absence
of the Face of the Unseen. Nevertheless, it always
tries to fill this gap. Whenever it attempts to signify
God, it always signifies this hollow. Consequently, the
aim of calligraphy collapses as a signification but it
returns to itself permanently. Ultimately, calligraphy
does not represent God but always represents the Absent
Face of God.
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This conclusion has some parallel ideas with
Sayın. Trying to represent the Face of God, calligraphy
always signifies the lack. The subject of the
calligraphy, calligrapher in the act of mimesis
“demands a wholeness, unity, and completion which it
imagines the other can bestow on it” (Grosz 137). In
the relation of love between God and the calligrapher
although calligrapher always aspires to a union or
unity with God, it is impossible. Because the two can
never become One. This creates the basis of the
representation in Islam.
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Fig. 1. Calligraphic Bird. (Khatibi 133)
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Fig. 2. A mirror-image Levha in Jali Thuluth Script,
78.5×70 cm Sami Efendi. (Ihsanoglu 137)
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Fig. 3. Ah Minel Aşk. (Aksel 136)
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Fig. 4. Calligraphic Lion. (Khatibi 34-5)
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Fig. 5. Calligraphic Lion and Antropomophric Script.
(Khatibi 108-9)
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Fig. 6. Face. (Khatibi 130)
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Fig. 7. Dört Kitabın Manası bellidir bir Elifte. Erol
Akyavaş. Mixed media on paper,150×50,1986.(Akyavaş 132)
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Fig.8. Erol Akyavaş. Acrylic on canvas. 208×150 cm,
1987. (Akyavaş 144)
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Fig. 9. Calligraphy or Painting? Acrylic on Canvas
(100×100), 1986. (Akyavaş 129)
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4. CONCLUSION
The main problem of the visual arts in Islamic
culture is the prohibition of icons and figural
representations.  There are two conventional arguments
on this issue, one defends that there is a prohibition,
the other defends that there is no prohibition.
However, empirical findings provide abundant examples
for both sides. In this thesis I attempted to
contemplate this complex problem. I thought that the
problem arises from the definition of figure,
discourse, form and icon. While advocating their
arguments, both sides of the debate share the same
ground based on the distinctions between meaning
(content)/ form and figure/discourse. These approaches
neglect the power of images. When they construct their
arguments, they consider the conventional wisdom.
However, images have excess, surplus. Although people
say that they know icons are only images, they behave
as if icons are real. This split is the point where
conventional arguments collapsed.
In order to refrain this problem, I prefer to use
literature on fetishism, which has a lot of advantage.
The logic of “as if” provides us a very plausible line
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of thinking which is constructed on the importance of
form. If we want to understand the value of anything,
we have to look at its systemic relations. How it is
articulated in the system, how its value determined,
are the basic questions in this framework. These
questions were enabled me to analyse primarily the form
not the content. I thought that the vital point is
concealed in the form. Thus, I try to develop a new
concept, icon-form in order to understand the
prohibition of icons.
Nevertheless, proposing a new concept is not
enough to solve the problem. I have to test the
usefulness of this concept in visual materials. Hence,
I choose the calligraphy for this reason. Because
calligraphy is the most important art form, which is
peculiar to Islamic culture. Additionally, calligraphy
is the main site on which both of the conventional
arguments do not work because of its undecidable
character. In calligraphy the distinction between form
and content or figure and discourse is broken. When
thinking on the prohibition of icons or figural
representation, how do the conventional arguments
locate the calligraphy? It is a huge problem. Is
calligraphy a figure or a discourse? Does it carry only
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the meaning? Is it solely an art form? Calligraphy,
against these arguments, finds a place for its own sake
between these distinctions. Its place is in cleavage.
At the same time it is a text and a figure. It carries
the holy message but it is also an art form (see Fig.
9). Although Face of God is unseen, calligraphy shows
the Face by concealing it. It signifies the Face of God
as an absence. It is a non-signified signifier that
always fails and returns to itself. It works by
breakdown. Such an art form deteriorates the
conventional arguments on writing and representation.
There is excess in calligraphy that transcends the
usual regimes of representations. While transcending
the imitatio, it creates mimesis by which it turns out
to be what it tries to reach. It is the objet a that
signifies the Absence of Face of the Unseen. It
signifies the lack, the absence.
There may be some problems in the usage of icon-
form. It may not work well. However, I am sure that if
we understand the prohibition of icons or figural
representation in Islam, we have to develop new
concepts. Because conventional approaches depend on the
general problem of metaphysics. They work on the binary
oppositions and their clear-cut divisions. We have to
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shake their safety places so as to understand the
Islamic economy of sign and art. The concept of icon-
form must be taken as a suggestion about this problem
by which I have tried to refrain from these
difficulties.
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